| Battle of Passchendaele Third Battle of Ypres |
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| Part of the Western Front of the First World War | |||||||
Australian gunners on a duckboard track in Château Wood near Hooge, 29 October 1917. Photo by Frank Hurley. |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| United Kingdom | German Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Douglas Haig Hubert Gough Herbert Plumer Arthur Currie John Monash François Anthoine |
Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria Friedrich Sixt von Armin Erich Ludendorff |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Disputed 200,000 – 448,614 |
Disputed 260,400 – 400,000 |
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The Battle of Passchendaele[Note 1] was one of the greatest campaigns of the First World War, taking place between July and November 1917. In a series of operations, Entente troops under British command attacked the Imperial German Army.[Note 2] The battle was fought for control of the ridge and village of Passchendaele (modern Passendale) near the city of Ypres in West Flanders, Belgium. The British objectives of the offensive were, 'wearing out the enemy' with a high-tempo series of bite-and-hold attacks, intended eventually to force the German army into a general withdrawal[1] and then 'securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier'. The British commander Sir Douglas Haig anticipated three phases in the campaign: the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush, an amphibious landing combined with an attack along the coast from Nieuport at the same time as the advance from Ypres reached Roulers.[2] The offensive also served to distract the German army from the French on the Aisne, who were suffering from widespread mutiny in the aftermath of the Nivelle Offensive.
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The British launched several massive attacks with limited geographical objectives, heavily supported by artillery, aircraft and often tanks. The British did not attain a decisive strategic success against a resolutely defended, extensive and sophisticated German defensive system; nonetheless the implications for the Germans of the effort required to defend the area left them with grave doubts as to their ability to withstand another defensive campaign in 1918. The British and French armies eventually obtained a tactical superiority and came close to an operational victory late in the year,
the battle caused
The battles consisted of 'bite-and-hold' attacks by the British army (to overcome the defender's advantage of rapid reinforcement, by capturing tactically valuable ground, reverting to the defensive and then holding it against German attempts to recapture it, thus wearing down the German army by forcing it into costly attacks and counter-attacks),[5] lasting until the Canadian Corps took Passchendaele on 6 November 1917; the battle ending on 10 November, apart from minor operations. Inflicting irreplaceable casualties on the Germans, the Allies captured 5 miles (8 km) of some of the most heavily defended territory in the world at a cost of 140,000 dead, a ratio of roughly 2 inches (5 cm) gained per dead soldier. The Germans reoccupied the lost ground when the line was shortened five months later, during the Battle of the Lys,[6] losing it for good on 28 September 1918.
Passchendaele has become synonymous with the misery of grinding attrition warfare often fought in thick mud. The land between Dixmude and the river Lys was criss-crossed by streams and drainage ditches, most of which flowed west towards the Ypres—Commines canal which ran north—south. The land was flat and swampy but for good drainage. August 1917 was unusually cold and wet and huge artillery bombardments destroyed the ground surface. There were dry periods, particularly in September but mud was a feature of parts of the battlefield; tanks bogged down and some soldiers and horses drowned in it. As a German soldier recorded:
Ridges ran in curves from south of Ypres, east then north to Passchendaele and Staden, rising to a maximum of sixty metres above sea level. This high ground had been bitterly contested since 1914.[8]
The battle is a subject of debate among historians, particularly in Britain. The volume of the British Official History of the War that covered Passchendaele was the last to be published and there are claims that it was biased to reflect well on Field Marshal Douglas Haig[9] and badly on General Hubert Gough, the commander of the Fifth Army; this reading has been challenged by Andrew Green[10] who points out that the published fourth draft is far less favourable to Haig than the first draft but does not scapegoat Gough for every failure. The heavy casualties the British Army suffered in return for slender territorial gains have led many historians to follow the example of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister and use it as an example of senseless waste and poor generalship. Lloyd George, almost certainly influenced by Basil Liddell Hart, devoted a hundred pages of his memoirs (three times as many as he devoted to the British victories from August 1918) to a critique of British generalship at Third Ypres.[11]
There is also a counter revisionist school of thought which seeks to emphasize the achievement of the British Army in the battle in inflicting great damage on the German Army, relieving pressure on the French and developing offensive tactics capable of overcoming German defensive positions, leaving the Germans desperate for winter weather
and which were significant in winning the war in 1918.[13][14]
Casualties for the battle are still a matter of controversy. Some accounts suggest that the Allies suffered significantly heavier losses than the Germans, while others offer more even figures. However, no one disputes that hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides became casualties.[15] The last survivor of the battle (and the last survivor of the Western Front in the United Kingdom) Private Harry Patch, died on 25 July 2009.[16]
The idea of a Flanders offensive had been in the mind of British commander Sir Douglas Haig for some time before the Battle of Passchendaele. In January 1916, he had ordered plans to be drawn up for an attack in the area.[17] Planning continued but the Battle of Verdun beginning in February 1916 and the demands of the Somme battles later in the year absorbed the BEF's offensive capacity.[18] In December 1916, at the conclusion of the Battle of the Somme, Haig chose Flanders as the most promising area for a British offensive in 1917. On 1 May 1917, Haig made a diary note of a letter to the War Cabinet,
by 21 June 1917 the principle of a Flanders offensive had met with the grudging approval of Lloyd George[20] and the approval of the British Cabinet.[21][22]
In late 1916 and early 1917, military leaders in Britain and France were optimistic that the casualties they had inflicted on the German army at Verdun and on the Somme meant that the German army was near to exhaustion. At the same time, the civilian political leaders of both nations were growing wary of the immense cost to their countries. At a conference in Chantilly in November 1916 and a series of subsequent meetings, the Entente agreed on an offensive strategy where they would overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts.[23] The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, sought to find ways of avoiding a repeat of the British casualties involved in the Battle of the Somme and proposed an alternative strategy at a conference in Rome, which would involve an offensive on the Italian front. British and French artillery would be transferred to Italy to add weight to the offensive.[24][25][26] This suggestion was opposed by the French and Italian delegations, as well as (at least covertly) the British officers present and was discarded.[27]
The new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in Spring 1917 could break the German front and lead to a decisive victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British; while many were sceptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nonetheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on the British.[28] Haig was ordered to co-operate with Nivelle's planned attack but secured Nivelle's agreement that in the event the first two phases (lesser offensives by the British at Arras and the French between the Somme and the Oise - the latter was cancelled because of the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line - to pin German reserves, followed by a French breakthrough on the Aisne) failed to deliver phase three (pursuit and exploitation), the British would attack in Flanders.[29]
Haig rejected Plumer's first, cautious, plan, because he felt that even if Nivelle's planned breakthrough on the Aisne failed, the Germans might well be left "disorganised and weak" and thus vulnerable to a Flanders offensive which was faster in tempo than the 1916 Somme advance.[31]
The front line around Ypres had changed relatively little since the end of the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914. The British held the city of Ypres, while the Germans held the high ground of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge to the south, the lower ridges to the east and the flat ground to the north.[33] [Note 3] Ypres was therefore in a salient sticking into German positions and overlooked by German artillery on the higher ground. It was difficult for the British forces to gain ground observation of the German rear areas east of the ridges.[35] The high ground would, indeed, prove crucial in the campaign.
Ypres was the only Belgian city not in German hands and had become an important political symbol as well as a strategic bastion; if the Germans captured Ypres, they would be able to threaten the Channel ports and thus British supply lines.[36] Driving the Germans away from Ypres would be a valuable objective. Roughly one-third of the U-boats which had recently begun unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain were based in occupied Belgian ports.[37] The U-boat bases assumed great importance in spring 1917 as shipping losses mounted.[36][38] Taking Passchendaele and then Roulers beyond, would threaten the Belgian ports. If the attack went very well it would be possible to outflank the German position in Belgium and threaten the German industrial heartland on the Ruhr, which might win the war quickly.[39] For the British generals, it was also considered advantageous that the German Army would fight hard to retain its positions in Flanders.[36][40] The strategic importance of Flanders and the proximity of the Dutch frontier meant that the Germans would be loath to allow a general withdrawal. Haig was optimistic that the German Army would soon run out of manpower because of the heavy losses suffered on the Somme and at Verdun.[36]
The Germans were aware that an attack in the Flanders sector was likely and had prepared extensive defences. German experience during 1916 indicated that it was relatively easy for an Allied assault to capture the first line of defence with the covering fire of the increasing amount and quality of Allied artillery. The terrain in some parts of the salient was waterlogged so digging in was not always possible. The Germans controlled the forward area with mutually supporting positions, generally based on breastworks, concrete pillboxes or blockhouses protected by barbed wire, making use of existing buildings and vegetation. To the rear of this zone were built five reserve lines of defence.[41]
A feature of the Ypres salient was mud. Apart from the ridges, the battlefield was low-lying; Ypres was on the 20-metre contour, Gheluvelt Plateau at 55 to 60 metres.[42] Naturally swampy, farming in this area was possible only because of an extensive drainage system.[43] Since 1914 the drainage had been largely destroyed, although some parts had been restored by Land Drainage Companies brought from England. On the whole, the area was considered by the British to be drier than Loos, Givenchy and Ploegsteert Wood further south.[44] 1917 turned out to be a year of particularly foul weather, with a very late spring and not much summer;[45] there were thunderstorms in July and August and while September was dry, October and onwards were wet. The mud was to become one of the defining features of the battle for soldiers on both sides and did a great deal to hamper operations. Haig was certainly aware of the nature of the ground he was launching his campaign[46] and closely monitored the weather.[47] What Haig knew about the climate is one of the many controversies about the battle.[Note 4] Sheffield says that the 'predictable' rain in August '... has no foundation in fact. The rain in Flanders during the battle was abnormally heavy.' [52]
Several plans for the Ypres offensive were produced between November 1916 and May 1917. Haig first ordered General Sir Hubert Plumer, the commander of the British Second Army which occupied the Ypres salient, to produce an attack plan. Haig was dissatisfied with the limited scope of Plumer's plan for the capture Messines Ridge and Pilckem Ridge. Plumer produced a revised plan, in which the first stage of the operation would capture Messines and Pilckem while also pushing some distance across the Gheluvelt Plateau. Shortly afterwards, this would be followed by an attack across the Gheluvelt Plateau, advacing to Passchendaele and then further on. Plumer reckoned that a force of 42 divisions and 5,000 guns would be necessary for this but the BEF had nowhere near 5,000 artillery pieces. Haig also asked for an assessment from Colonel Macmullen on his staff, who proposed that the Gheluvelt Plateau be taken by a massed tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; tank experts rejected this idea as utterly impractical. Plumer then produced a second revision of his plan; Messines Ridge would be attacked first, along with the western part of Gheluvelt and then Pilckem Ridge attacked a short while later. The involvement of Henry Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson produced yet another iteration of the plan; Messines alone should be the first target and Gheluvelt and Pilckem Ridge attacked within 47–72 hours.[53]
In April 1917, the French Nivelle Offensive took place, with the main effort by the French on the Aisne, while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary attack at Arras. The French attack gained ground but at the cost of great casualties and failed to obtain the breakthrough Nivelle had promised; Nivelle was relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the summer it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops.[54] The failure of the French breakthrough attempt meant that any offensive on the Western front would be a largely British affair, as the French were exhausted. Lloyd George, while still attempting to promote his favoured Italian campaign, had little option but to support Haig's Flanders offensive.[55][56] On 7 May, Haig set the timetable for his Flanders offensive, with 7 June the date for a preliminary attack on the Messines Ridge. A week after Messines ridge was captured Haig gave his objectives to his Army commanders, which were 'wearing out the enemy' and 'securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier' by the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush an attack along the coast with an amphibious landing[57]
also putting his views to the War Cabinet in a memorandum of 12 June where he wrote
and that the extent of the success to be gained was dependent on War Cabinet priorities, the state of Russia and German staying power.
The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. These German positions dominated Ypres and unless neutralised, would be able to enfilade any British attack eastwards from the salient.[60] Messines and Wytschaete were powerful positions but being on a forward slope were exposed to observation and attack; their defence was a preoccupation of the German troops in the sector.[60][61] Both villages had been extensively fortified and the area was littered with pillboxes, blockhouses and dugouts. In accordance with the German Army's new defensive methods, the forward area was lightly held, with counter-attack formations held in reserve.[62]
The attack on Messines was the responsibility of General Sir Herbert Plumer and the British Second Army. Plumer's planned for nine infantry divisions from X, IX and II Anzac Corps to advance 1,500 yards and take the first line of German defences on the front line of the ridge. This plan was extended by Haig to require the capture of the second line of defences on the rear edge of the ridge including Wytschaete and to move down the reverse side of the slope to take a further line of defences, an advance of about 3,000 yards.[63] A preparatory bombardment for the attack began on 21 May; Plumer deployed a total of 2,266 artillery pieces, of which 757 were heavy.[64] An important part of the bombardment was counter-battery fire against German artillery positions. In spite of the Germans bringing 630 guns to bear, this was largely successful.[64]
The British advance began on 7 June and was preceded by a unique display of military pyrotechnics. Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging mines under the German positions on the Messines Ridge. By June 1917 21 mines had been dug, filled with nearly 1,000,000 lb (450,000 kg) of explosives between them.[65] The Germans were aware of British mining efforts and had taken some countermeasures but the scale of the mining came as a surprise to them.[66] Two of the British mines failed to detonate but the remaining 19 were fired simultaneously at 03.10 GMT.[62] The effect of the mine explosions was immense, destroying a large part of the German front line and support positions.
As soon as the mines exploded, the British guns recommenced firing, providing a heavy creeping barrage which was closely followed by assaulting infantry and tanks.[67][68] Messines was taken at around 05.00. The second phase of the attack began at 07.00 and by 09.00 the British had taken Wytschaete. German resistance was scant and German positions were overwhelmed. At 15.10 the attack was renewed as fresh troops supported by tanks, pressed down the ridge to the final objectives, which were largely gained before dark on the 7th.[68][69] British losses in the morning were light, although the plan had expected casualties of up to 50% in the initial attack. As the advance continued over the ridge, British supporting artillery was less able to provide supporting fire, while giving easier opportunities to German artillery fire.[69] Fighting continued around Messines Ridge until 12 June.[70]
The attack was generally considered a success. It demonstrated that by bringing overwhelming fire power to bear and resisting the temptation to set over-ambitious goals, it was possible for the attacking side to prevail even against fortified positions. Over 7,000 German prisoners and 48 artillery pieces were taken.[71][72] The attack also succeeded in its objective of preparing the way for the main attack later in the summer.
German anxiety that the British would exploit their victory at Messines by advancing to the Tower Hamlets spur beyond the north end of Messines Ridge, led Crown Prince Rupprecht on 9 June to propose a withdrawal to the Flandern Line in the area east of Messines; construction of defences in the area was begun but on 13 June Colonel von Lossberg arrived as the new Chief of Staff of Fourth Army.[73] Lossberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern Line and ordered that the current front line east of the Oosttaverne Line be held rigidly as the front of a Flandern Stellung (position) in depth, in front of the Flandern Line which was to become Flandern I, with a new Flandern II line (west of Menin, north to Terhand and Passchendaele) forming the back line of a new Flandern II Stellung. Another line, Flandern III, east of Menin north to Moorslede was also started.[74]
Debate among the German commanders continued. On 25 June Ludendorff suggested to Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm (third) Line, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht (second) Line. On 30 June Rupprecht's Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl suggested a withdrawal to Flandern I along Passchendaele Ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentieres in the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and also force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Oosttaverne Iine was easy to defend, that the Menin Road Ridge could be held (albeit with a maximum effort) and that Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans had observation of the area from Passchendaele Ridge, which allowed German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire.[75] Lossberg's views were accepted and no withdrawal was made.
The defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks: Ia, Ib and Ic each about 200 yards apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no-man's-land. About 2,000 yards behind these works was the Albrecht ('second' or 'artillery protective') Line, the rear boundary of the forward battlezone ('Kampffeld'). Companies of the support battalions were placed at the back of the Kampffeld, half in the pill-boxes of the Albrecht Line. Dispersed in front of the line were divisional Sharpshooter machine-gun nests (the 'Stutzpunkt-Linie'). The Albrecht Line also marked the front of the main battlezone ('Grosskampffeld'), behind which (about another 2,000 yards away) was the Wilhelm (third) Line. This zone contained most of the field artillery supporting the front divisions. In pill-boxes of the Wilhelm Line were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments in divisional reserve.[76]
From the Wilhem (third) Line to Flandern I was a rearward battlezone ('ruckwartige Kampffeld') containing the support and reserve assembley areas for the Eingreif divisions. The failures at Verdun in December 1916 and at Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the Kampffeld had been overrun and its garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the Grosskampffeld by the Eingreif divisions, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons before they were destroyed.
The leading regiment of an Eingreif ('interlocking') division was to advance into the zone of the front division with its other two regiments moving forward in close support. The support and reserve assembly areas in the Flandern Stellung were termed Fredericus Rex Raum and Triarier Raum (by analogy with the formation of a Roman legion, hastati, principes and triarii). Eingreif Divisions were accommodated 10,000 to 12,000 yards behind the front line and began their advance to their assembly areas in the ruckwartige Kampffeld, ready to intervene in the Grosskampffeld,[78]'den sofortigen Gegenstoss' (the instant-immediate counterthrust).[79]
Lossberg rejected the elastic defence principle in Flanders, since the British had such a mass of artillery and the infrastructure necessary to supply it with huge amounts of ammunition. There was little prospect of any delay being imposed on British attacks by the need to move artillery forward and build supply routes in an attack towards Flandern I.
The counter-attack was to be the main tactical response to attacks on the front divisions as local withdrawals would only disorganise the troops moving forward to their assistance. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters which were man traps; they were to evacuate them as soon as the battle began and move forward and to the flanks to avoid enemy fire and to counter-attack. A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons ('sicherheits-besatzungen') were separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth once the enemy attack had been repulsed.[81]
German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of 36 MG08/15 (equivalent to the British Lewis gun) per regiment. The Trupp of eight men was augmented by a MG08/15 crew of four men to become a Gruppe, with the Trupp component renamed Stosstrupp, giving the German unit better means for fire and manoeuvre. 60% of the front line garrison were Stosstrupps, 40% were Stossgruppen based in the forward battlezone. Stoss-kompagnien occupied the Albrecht (second) Line (80%) and Stoss-batallione in divisional reserve (all being Stoss formations) and then the Eingreif division (all Stoss formations) arrayed in the Fredericus Rex and Triarii positions. The essence of all of these defensive preparations was riposte,
demonstrating that the growing power and sophistication of Allied attacks could only be countered by equally attacking methods.
The Fourth Army had twenty-five miles of front to defend with three Groups, Dixmude (XIV Corps), Ypres (III Bavarian Corps) and Wytschaete (IX Reserve Corps); Group Staden (Guards-Reserve-Corps) was added later. Group Dixmude held twelve miles, with four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions; Group Ypres held six miles from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wytschaete held a similar length of front south of Menin Road with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. These Eingreif divisions were placed behind the Menin and Passchendaele Ridges. Five miles further back were four more Eingreif divisions and seven miles beyond them another two in OHL reserve.[83]
On 1 June 1917, General Sir Hubert Gough assumed command of Fifth Army, which was now responsible for the Ypres salient north of the Messines Ridge. Haig had selected Gough to command the offensive on 30 April but Gough was commanding British forces south of Arras at the time and delayed his arrival in Ypres until the conclusion of the Second Battle of Bullecourt.[84] Gough immediately set about planning the attack. Vth Brigade HQ RFC moved with 5th Army HQ and by 31 July the Allied air concentration from the Lys to the sea consisted of 840 aircraft, 330 being fighters. By 31 July the German Fourth Army had about 600 aircraft, 200 being single-seat fighters[85]
The intended slow build-up of Allied air activity over the Fifth and Second armies was changed on 8 July to an immediate maximum effort due to the German air service making a similar effort of air and artillery spotting and attacking British Corps aircraft (conducting operations over the front line, while Army aircraft went further afield).[86] Poor weather stopped this until the 11th July. The Germans had been sending larger formations into action and on 12 July the greatest amount of air activity since the war began took place. Late on about thirty German fighters engaged British and French fighters in a dogfight lasting for an hour. Nine RFC (Royal Flying Corps) aircraft were lost for a claim of fourteen German aircraft for the day.[87] Until the end of July the British and French air effort by night as well as day was resisted by the Germans until they were worn down. The Germans continued periodically to assemble bigger formations and on 26 July near Polygon Wood fifty Albatros scouts were engaged by thirty-seven British fighters. During the melée four German reconnaissance aircraft were able to slip over the line and make observations around Ypres. Next evening eight British aircraft over Menin lured about 20 Albatros scouts to Polygon Wood, where 59 British fighters were waiting. Allied and German aircraft in the vicinity joined in the dogfight and after an hour the surviving German aircraft withdrew. The British decoys shot down six German aircraft and the ambushers another three for a loss of two British aircraft.[88]
On 27 July a Royal Flying Corps reconnaissance aircraft detected a German tactical withdrawal, which enabled XIV Corps to occupy 3,000 yards of the German front line. Next day the fine weather allowed the RFC to conduct a large amount of observation for counter-battery fire and to detect numerous German batteries which had been moved. Operations to deprive the Germans of air observation over the attack front were curtailed by poor weather on 29 and 30 July. On the commencement of the ground offensive on 31 July, low cloud returned and stopped the air operation in support. Small numbers of aircraft were sent out to seek targets of opportunity and some contact patrolling was managed at very low level, giving good information about the progress of the ground battle and leaving thirty British aircraft damaged by bullets and shells.[89]
Gough's plan involved a preparatory bombardment starting on 16 July, initially scheduled to finish on 25 July. On the 25th, the Second Army would create the impression of a more ambitious attack on Messines Ridge by capturing outposts in the Warneton Line, east of the ridge.[90] Fifth Army would attack along a front of about 14,000 yards together with the French First Army on its northern flank, running from Houthoulst Forest in the north to Kleine Zillebecke in the South, with the main effort on the Gheluvelt Plateau. Their objective on the first day would be an advance of 3,000–3,500 yards to the 'Green Line' for consolidation with a possible further advance to the 'Red Line' (a total of 4,000–5,000 yards) by advanced guards, as far as Polygon Wood, Broodseinde and Langemarck, depending on German resistance to the principal advance.
The decision to attempt this was left to the discretion of the division commanders.[92][93] An attack of this nature was not a breakthrough operation; the German defensive position known as Flandern I lay 10,000–12,000 yards behind the front and would not be attacked on the first day,[94] nonetheless it was more ambitious than Plumer's earlier plan, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yards. Major-General John Davidson BGGS/Operations a (Director of Operations at GHQ) wrote a memorandum due to his concern that there was 'ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives' [95] and suggested reverting to the idea of a 1,750 yard advance, to increase the concentration of British artillery. Gough replied to the memo stressing the need to plan for opportunities to take ground left temporarily undefended, before the Germans could recover and that these opportunities were more likely in the first attack which had had long preparation:
It is important to recognise that the results to be looked for from a well-organised attack which has taken weeks and months to prepare are great, much ground can be gained and prisoners and guns captured during the first day or two.[96]
I think we should certainly aim at the definite capture of the Green Line, and that, should the situation admit of our infantry advancing without much opposition to the Red Line, it would be of the greatest advantage to us to do so.[97]
Haig arranged a meeting with Davidson, Gough and Plumer on 28 June (the day after increasing the size of II Corps with 24th division and the artillery of 23rd and 24th divisions plus another 25 heavy and 13 medium batteries).[98] Plumer supported Gough's plan and Haig let it stand.[99]
Maxse, Gough's XVIII Corps commander, left numerous snooty comments in the margins of his copy of the Davidson memo to the effect that he was being too pessimistic.[100]
Gough intended to use ten divisions of infantry (plus a brigade from the 18th Division) in the Fifth Army, making about 100,000 men plus two of the French 1st Army and five of the British Second Army. Fifth Army had 752 heavy guns and 1,442 field guns, while they could also count on support from 300 heavy guns and 240 field guns belonging to the French First Army in the north and 112 heavy guns and 210 field guns of Second Army to the south. Gough also intended to use 120 Mark IV tanks to support the attack, with another 48 held in reserve. While Gough had five divisions of cavalry at his disposal, only one brigade was planned to be deployed and that only in the event that the northernmost corps of infantry reached its objectives.[102]
During the preliminary bombardment [German divisions present during the bombardment phase July 16–30, 1917: 3rd Guard, 235th, 38th, 22nd Reserve, 10th Bavarian, 18th Reserve, 16th, 111th, 6th Bavarian Reserve (relieved 30 July), 49th Reserve (relieved 28 July) and 233rd (relieved 30 July) divisions], the artillery was expected to destroy German strongpoints and trenches, engage in counter-battery fire to suppress German artillery and cut barbed wire entanglements around German positions. On the day of the attack, the first wave of infantry would advance under a creeping barrage advancing 100 yards every 4 minutes.[103] They would be followed up by more infantry advancing in columns or flexible 'artillery formation'. To prepare for the attack, the infantry trained on a full-scale replica of the German trench system, which had been pieced together from aerial reconnaissance photographs and trench raids. Specialist platoons were given additional training on methods to destroy German pillboxes and blockhouses.[104]
The attack was delayed at Anthoine's request on 1 July as his First Army needed more time to prepare artillery emplacements and then Gough asked on 7 July for a delay of five days.[105] Some of Gough's heavy artillery had been lost to the German counter-bombardment, some delayed in arriving and bad weather had hampered the programme of counter-battery fire.[106] Haig agreed to delay until the 28th. Anthoine then requested another delay because of the poor weather slowing his artillery preparation and after Gough supported Anthoine, Haig reluctantly agreed to delay to 31 July, even though this meant postponing Operation Hush from 7–8 August to the next period of high tides.[107]
The assault began at 3.50 am on 31 July,
The attack was meant to commence at dawn but low cloud meant that it was still dark.[109] The attack had most success on the left (north), in front of XIV Corps (United Kingdom) and the French First Army. In this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 2,500–3000 yards, up to the line of the Steenbeck river.[110] In the centre of the British attack, XVIII and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the Steenbeck to consolidate and sent advanced guards towards the Green and Red Lines, (on XIX Corps's front) an advance of some 4,000 yards.[111] In these areas, the preliminary bombardment had succeeded in destroying the front line of the German position and the creeping barrage was effective in supporting the infantry attack at least as far as the first objective.[110] This meant that the infantry and some tanks had the strength to deal with German strongpoints encountered after the first line and 'vorfeldzone' had been penetrated and were able to push on.[112]
The main attack of the offensive by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, was less successful against the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding and Eingreif divisions. 8th Division advanced towards Westhoek and took the Blue and Black lines 'without a hitch.... the advance of the 25th Infantry Brigade over the Black line towards the Green Line was splendid and was going strong. It was then that our southern flank became exposed to the concentrated fire of enemy machine-guns.'. [114] from Nonne Boschen and Glencorse Wood. These obstacles had been objectives for 30th Division on 8th Division's right. 30th Division and 24th Division failed to advance far over boggy ground and because much of the German machine-gun defence on this section of the front remained intact.[115] This was not known to 8th Division until just before the 25th Brigade was due to advance over Westhoek Ridge. Brigadier General Coffin decided that it was too late to stop the attack and sent a company of the reserve battalion to fill the gap to the south. It was not enough so the Brigade consolidated on the reverse slope and held the crest with Lewis gun posts. Small pockets of ground lost to German counter-attacks were regained by British counter-attacks.[116] The 17th Brigade on the right of 24th Division reached its objective 1,000 yards east of Klein Zillebeke. The 73rd Brigade in the centre was stopped by German pillboxes at Lower Star Post and 72nd Brigade on the left reached the Bassevillebeek but then had to withdraw to a line south from Bodmin Copse a few hundred yards short of the Blue Line. 30th Division had to advance across the Gheluvelt Plateau, the hardest advance of all so was reinforced by a Brigade of 18th Division.[117] The 21st Brigade on the right lost the barrage crossing the wreckage of Sanctuary Wood and took until 6 a.m. to capture Stirling Castle Ridge. Attempts to advance further were stopped by German machine-gun fire.
90th Brigade to the left was also stopped on the first objective. German artillery fire fell on Sanctuary Wood and Chateau Wood from 05.00 a.m. and succeeded in stopping the advance of the 30th Division, except for a short move forward of about 300 yards south of Westhoek. The British artillery barrages made it impossible for German infantry to counter-attack in this area.[119]
The success of the British advance in the centre of the front caused some concern to Von Armin the army commander and his Chief of Staff Von Lossberg. While the defensive system was designed to deal with some penetration, it was meant to prevent the 4,000-yard advance that XVIII and XIX Corps had achieved. The (Eingreif) 50th Reserve Division (either side of Westroosebeek) and 221st Division (between Moorslede and Zonnebeke) were ordered (mit fester Stimme gab ich den Befehl) to counter-attack the flanks of the British break-in, supported by all available artillery and aircraft about midday. The three brigades facing the counter-attack were depleted and strung out after dealing with German strongpoints earlier in the morning and could not communicate with their artillery. The German counter-attack was able to drive them back to the 'Green Line' with 70% losses, where it was stopped by mud, artillery and machine-gun fire.[120] Local counter-attacks on the II Corps front and that of Second Army to its south were not supported by Eingreif divisions as the British had not reached the Albrecht (second) Line. Colonel von Lossberg was promoted to Major General the next day.[121]
The British Official History[122] gives Fifth Army casualties for 31 July to 3 August as 27,001; 3,697 of them killed. Second Army casualties 31 July to 2 August are 4,819; 769 killed. German Fourth Army casualties (3rd Guard, 235th, 38th, 22nd Reserve, 10th Bavarian, 18th Reserve, 16th, 32nd, 2nd Guard Reserve (Eingreif), 12th (Eingrief), 221st, 52nd Reserve (Eingreif), 207th (Eingreif), 50th Reserve (Eingreif), 111th and 23rd Reserve divisions)[123] [124] for 21 – 31 July are '30,000 in round numbers'[125] excluding 'wounded whose recovery was to be expected in a reasonable time'. The British Official Historian added another 10,000 for this category. The accuracy of Edmonds's casualty statistics for the German army has been questioned ever since.
Intended for 2 August, (but delayed by rain to 9 August) to prepare the way for the general offensive (due on 4 August but postponed due to rain to 13 August, 14 August then 16 August) and then delayed for another 24 hours by a thunderstorm on the 8th (with 10mm of rain, after the 25mm which fell between 1 and 4 August),[126] II Corps attacked on 10 August to capture the rest of the 'black line' (the second objective of 31 July).[127] British artillery fire was distributed across the battlefront for the general attack (eventually made on the 16th) while the Germans concentrated their artillery on the II and XIX Corps fronts. British counter-battery efforts were hampered by the adverse weather, making air observation extremely difficult so much of the effort was wasted by inaccurate fire and an inability to see German artillery shifting position (among three or four alternative emplacements per battery). The state of the ground, German artillery fire and British artillery losses foreshadowed the situation in late October opposite Passchendaele Ridge.[128] 8th and 30th Divisions were relieved by 25th and 18th Divisions by 4 August but this meant that due to the rain delays they were exhausted by the 10th, despite the front line troops being relieved every 48 hours.[129] The advance succeeded but German artillery fire and infantry counter-attacks isolated the British infantry of 18th Division, which had captured Glencorse Wood and about 7 p.m. German infantry behind a smokescreen recaptured all but the north-west corner of the Wood.
Only 25th Division's gains on Westhoek Ridge were held.[131] The attacking brigade advanced at 4.25 a.m. fast enough to evade the German barrage on the British front line and reached its objectives by 5.30 a.m. ably assisted by five RFA brigades of artillery. The German garrison of Westhoek was rushed, while on the right of the attack sniping and attacks by German aircraft caused considerable casualties. The division lost 158 killed, 1,033 wounded and more than 100 missing (most being killed). The difficulties encountered by the 18th Division in Glencorse Wood on the right made consolidation difficult, due to sniping and machine-gun fire. During the day and night of 10/11 August the Germans made several attempts to counter-attack but excellent artillery liaison by SOS signal, daylight lamps, pigeons and runners meant that teh guns broke up the German troops in their assembly poistions, except for one attack at 7.15 p.m. which was driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire.[132]
The Battle of Hill 70 was a small operation of World War I between the Canadian Corps and five divisions of the German Sixth Army. The battle took place along the Western Front on the outskirts of Lens in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France between 15 August 1917 and 25 August 1917. The effect of the British operation here was felt in Flanders
Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and was partially flooded. Continuous shelling had destroyed drainage canals in the area and unseasonable heavy rain in August turned areas into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front on duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain and shelling.
Fifth army headquarters was influenced by the effect that delay would have on the coastal operation, which needed the high tides at the end of August or it would have to be postponed for a month.[134] Gough intended the 'green line' (just beyond the German Wilhelm (third) Line from Polygon Wood to Langemarck) either not captured or not held on 31 July by II, XIX and XVIII Corps to be taken.[135] Gough delayed the general offensive for a day but then a thunderstorm on the 14th forced another 24 hour postponement to the early hours of 16 August. In the II Corps area the disappointment of 10 August were repeated with the infantry managing a modest advance, being isolated by German artillery and then (except in the 25th Division area) forced back to their start line by German infantry counter-attacks, after they had run out of ammunition. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery fire inflicting heavy losses.[136]
The advance further north in the XVIII Corps area retook and held St Julien and the area south east of Langemarck while XIV Corps captured Langemarck and the Wilhelm Line (IIIrd Line) north of the Ypres-Staden railway near the Kortebeek. The French First Army conformed, pushing up to the Kortebeek and St Jansbeck stream west of the northern stretch of the Wilhelm Line (IIIrd Line) where it crossed to the east side of the Kortebeek.[137]
Nonetheless Ludendorff's verdict was less sanguine,
Exploiting observation from higher ground to the east, the German divisions (5th Bavarian (Eingreif), 34th, 214th, 3rd Reserve, 119th, 183rd, 32nd, 9th Bavarian Reserve, 204th, 54th, 12th Reserve (Eingreif), 26th Reserve, 79th Reserve (Eingreif), 26th and 26th Reserve)[141] were able to inflict heavy losses on the British divisions holding the new line beyond Langemarck. After two fine dry days on 17 and 18 August, XIX and XVIII Corps began pushing closer to the German IIIrd (Wilhelm) Line. On 20 August an operation by British tanks, artillery and infantry captured strongpoints along the St Julien – Poelkappelle road and on 22 August larger gains were made (despite the tank support mostly ditching behind the British front line) by XVIII and XIX Corps, which still left them overlooked by the Germans in the uncaptured part of the Wilhelm (IIIrd) Line, from east of Langemarck south to the Ypres – Zonnebeke road.[142]
II Corps resumed operations to capture Nonne Bosschen and Glencorse Woods and Inverness Copse around the Menin Road on 22 August, the Copse and Herenthage Park being the first objective. The German outpost line was on the western edge of the Copse about 600 yards west of the Albrecht (IInd) Line. The 14th (Light) Division with some tanks forced the German defenders back to the Albrecht (IIIrd) line at the Herenthage Chateau, with heavy losses to both sides. The 90 British troops not casualties were forced back by a German counter-attack to the western edge of the Copse. Next morning the German 34th Division made a second counter-attack which collided with the two British tanks still operational of five sent to attack German strong points in Inverness Copse. The counter-attack melted away. At 6.00 a.m. on the 23rd, after a German hurricane bombardment fell on them in the Copse, the German infantry advanced, reached the western edge of the Copse then fell back, still under fire from German artillery. Another attempt in the afternoon, under a hail of fire from both artilleries, pushed the British out of the Copse and eventually a British counter-attack was cancelled, due to uncertainty about the position of the front line. The British general offensive intended for 27 August was changed because of this failure to hold ground, then postponed due to more bad weather.[143]
British casualties for 31 July to 28 August are given as 68,010 by the British Official Historian; 10,266 being killed,[144] with a claim that 37 German divisions had been exhausted and withdrawn.
The French attacked at Verdun on 20 August and by 9 September had taken 10,000 prisoners. Fighting continued sporadically into October, adding to the German army's difficulties on the Western Front and elsewhere.
Despite the failure of the British Fifth Army to complete the advance to the 'black' and 'green' lines from 31 July during August,
The rain, bombardments and British air attacks also undermined the fighting power of the Germans who had not become casualties.[147]
Haig decided to transfer more of the weight of the offensive towards the south-east along the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge.[148] Principal authority for the offensive switched to the British Second Army under command of General Herbert Plumer on 25 August. Gough had abandoned attempts to exploit opportunities created by the 'bite' part of the operation in his Operation Order of 31 July, which required II Corps to capture the rest of the 'black line' (of the 31 July objectives) on 2 August and then II, XIX and XVIII Corps to advance to the original 'green line' on 4 August; plans which corresponded to the delayed attack of 10 August by II Corps, for the battle of Langemarck (16—18 August) and later operations by the same corps,[149]
Plumer's planning continued the evolution of British attacking methods; he planned to launch several attacks after a pause of about three weeks, each with even more limited geographical objectives and more elaborate artillery covering fire than Gough's (which had been foreshadowed in the Fifth Army GOC R.A. Major General H. Uniacke's report of 25 August),[151] to ensure that the infantry were organised on tactically advantageous ground and in contact with their artillery when they received German counter-attacks.[148]
Plumer’s initial intention was to capture Gheluvelt Plateau in four steps, with an interval of six days between each to allow time to bring forward artillery and supplies.[153]
Up to this point, the Germans were employing defence in depth, whereby the front line was lightly held and reserve troops deployed outside British artillery range.[154] The previous British attacks had exhausted themselves without significantly affecting the fighting capacity of the main German troop body.[154] The German reserves had then repelled some of the exhausted British advanced troops by counter-attacks, albeit with heavy losses.[154]
Plumer's tactical refinements sought to undermine the German defence in depth by limiting objectives to a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against German counter-attacking (Eingreif) divisions, rather than against the local defenders. By further reorganising the infantry's reserves, Plumer ensured that the echelons in depth of the attacking divisions roughly corresponded to the echelons in depth of the local German counter-attack reserves and their arriving Eingreif divisions. This meant that more support was provided for the advance and then defence against German counter-attacks. More units would attack on narrower fronts and troops would advance no more than 1,500 yards (1,400 m) into the German defence zone, before consolidating their position.[154] When the Germans counter-attacked they would find a zone of defence-in-depth still heavily protected by artillery, like the 'green' and 'black' lines on 31 July and consequently suffer heavy casualties to little effect.
The pause in British operations while Plumer moved even more artillery into the area of the Gheluvelt plateau helped to mislead the Germans. At first General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind, 'My innermost conviction that the battle of Flander has finished is strengthened more and more.'. Despite Kuhl still urging caution, two divisions, 13 heavy batteries and 12 field batteries of artillery, three fighter squadrons and four air force units were transferred from Fourth Army.[156]
The plan of attack included special emphasis on the need for heavy and medium artillery.[157] This was not only to destroy the German concrete shelters and machine gun nests (more numerous in the battle zones being attacked, since German outpost zones had been captured), during the preparatory bombardment but also to engage in counter-battery fire before and during the assault.[157] 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers were allocated to Plumer for the battle;[158] this was equivalent to one artillery piece for every five yards of the attack front, more than double the proportion used at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge.[158][159] The ammunition requirements for the seven days bombardment prior to assault was estimated at 3.5 million rounds.[158] This allotment provided a density of fire four times as great as the attack made on 31 July.[158] Heavy and medium howitzers were to make two layers of the creeping barrage 200 yards deep, ahead of two field artillery belts equally deep plus a machine-gun barrage. Beyond the 'creeper', four heavy artillery counter-battery double groups with 222 guns and howitzers covered a 7,000-yard front, ready to engage any German guns which opened fire with gas and high explosive shell.[160]
The British began a 'desultory bombardment' on 31 August[161] and also sought to neutralize the German batteries with poison gas in the days before the attack, including gas attacks on each of the three preceding evenings before the assault.[162]
On 20 September, after a massive bombardment, the Allies attacked on a 14,500 yard front and captured most their objectives to a depth of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) by mid-morning.[163] The Germans made many counter-attacks, beginning around 3.00pm until early evening, all of which failed to gain ground or were able to make only a temporary penetration of the new British positions on the Second Army front. A small area on the Fifth Army front attacked by 51st Division was recaptured by German counter-attacks.
The Germans by this time had an improvised front line, with very deep dugouts and concrete pillboxes, supported by artillery ranged on no man's land. The attack was a great success and caused no small panic to German commanders; proving quite clearly to them that their defences could no longer fend off a well-prepared attack under good conditions.
The British Official History records that the counter-attack divisions had been held back waiting for another British advance which never came.[167]
Six divisions of the Second Army attacked; 1st and 2nd Australian, 19th, 23rd, 39th and 41st. The German 9th Reserve, 3rd Bavarian Ersatz and 121st divisions held the Gheluvelt Plateau from Lower Star Post (near the Zandvoorde road) north to Zonnebeek (about four miles). Each German division had all three regiments in the line, with one battalion in the outpost zone, one in support in and behind the Wilhelm (third) Line and one in reserve behind Flandern I. The 3rd Bavarian Ersatz and 121st Divisions had 106 heavy and 160 field guns and howitzers, plus a Corps artillery group to hold their portion of the front. All but 41st Division reached all their objectives according to plan. The 41st Division failed to capture Tower Hamlets on Bassevillebeek spur, after struggling through the mud in the Bassevillebeek valley, losing the creeping barrage and suffering heavy losses. Part of the division reached the third objective and the rest advanced just beyond the second. Despite the failure to capture Tower Hamlets, the Division defeated all German counter-attacks during the day.[168]
Five Fifth Army divisions attacked to the north of Second Army. 9th and 58th Divisions reached all their objectives and 20th Light, 51st and 55th fell somewhat short.[169] Overnight rain muddied the ground like that affecting 41st Division; tank support fell behind in the bad going and German strong points like Schuler Farm in the 55th Division area held out for much of the day. 51st Division eventually reached its third objective but was pushed back by German counter-attacks in the north of its area to the Wilhem (third) Line ('Pheasant Trench'). The division eventually counter-attacked there and reached the first objective.[170]
Minor attacks took place after the 20th September as both sides jockeyed for position and reorganised their defences.[171] A larger attack by the Germans on 25 September recaptured pill boxes at the south western end of Polygon Wood at the cost of heavy casualties.
Having confided his anxieties in his diary for 23 and 24 September
and
Crown Prince Rupprecht was relieved by the partial success of the attack
Not long after, the German positions near Polygon Wood were swept away by Plumer's attack of 26 September (the Battle of Polygon Wood).
British casualties 20 – 25 September are given by the British Official Historian as 20,255; 3,148 being killed. 3,243 prisoners were taken with 'very heavy' losses of killed or wounded inflicted on the German defenders (208th, 2nd Guard Reserve, 36th, 25th (Eingreif), 121st, Bavarian Ersatz, 9th Reserve, 234th and 16th Bavarian divisions).[174][175]
After the Battle of Menin Road Ridge the German defensive deployment was changed. In August German front-line divisions had two regiments (of three battalions) forward with the third regiment in reserve. The front battalions had needed to be relieved much more quickly than expected due to the British bombardments, attacks and the weather which had caused units to become mixed up. The reserve regiments had not been able to intervene early enough and so the front battalions had been unsupported until the Eingreif divisions arrived, some hours after the commencement of the attack.[176]
The deployment was changed to increase the number of troops on the front line. By 26 September all three regiments of the front line division were forward, each holding an area 1,000 yards wide and 3,000 yards deep. One battalion was forward with the second in support and the third in close reserve. These battalions were to move forward successively to engage the fresh enemy battalions advancing through those that had delivered the first attack. The Eingreif divisions were to deliver a staged attack with artillery support later in the day but before the British could consolidate their new line.[177] This change was intended to remedy the neutralization of the front division's reserve by the British artillery so that it could intervene before the Eingreif divisions arrived.
On 22 September new requirements were given: more artillery counter-fire was to be used between British attacks, half to be counter-battery and half against infantry; more raiding to compel the British to hold the line in greater strength, thus giving the artillery a denser target; better artillery observation in the battle zone to increase the accuracy of German artillery fire when British troops advanced into it and quicker counter-attacks.[178]
On 21 September Haig instructed the Fifth and Second Armies to make the next step across the Gheluvelt Plateau on a front of 8,500 yards. I ANZAC Corps would conduct the main advance of about 1,200 yards to complete the occupation of Polygon Wood and the south of Zonnebeke. X Corps to the south was to attack either side of the Menin Road and Fifth Army in the north was to advance to occupy a line from Zonnebeke to Kansas Cross, plus Hill 40 near Zonnebeke station.[179] Second Army altered its Corps frontages soon after the attack of 20 September so that each attacking division could be concentrated on a 1,000 yard front. Roads and light railways were built behind the new front line to allow artillery and ammunition to be moved forward, beginning on 20 September. In fine weather this was finished in four days. As before Menin Road, bombardment and counter-battery fire began immediately, with practice barrages fired daily as a minimum. Artillery from VIII and IX Corps in the south acted to threaten attacks on Zandvoorde and Warneton.
39th Division took over from 41st ready to attack Tower Hamlets (on the Bassevillebeke spur), 33rd Division replaced 23rd Division beyond the Menin Road and 5th and 4th Australian Divisions replaced 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions in Polygon Wood.[180] The German attack on 25 September between Menin Road and Polygon Wood occurred as 33rd Division was taking over from 23rd Division and for a time threatened to delay preparations here for the British operation due next day. Some ground was captured by the Germans and part of it was then recaptured by 33rd Division. Plumer ordered that the flank guard protecting the I ANZAC Corps on 26 September was to be formed by 98th Brigade of 33rd Division while 100th Brigade recaptured the lost ground.[181]
At 5.50 a.m. on 26 September the five layers of barrage fired by the British artillery and machine-guns landed in front of the attacking divisions. Dust and smoke added to the morning mist so the infantry advanced on compass bearings and rushed the German outposts of 3rd Reserve Division and part of 50th Reserve Division, most falling immediately.[182] The Australian divisions attacked with two brigades each with one in reserve. A battalion in each advanced 800 yards to the first objective, then two more passed through to the final objective about 400 yards beyond and dug in.
The German defences in the wood disintegrated quickly (Major Hethey, KTK ('Kampftruppenkommandeur') in the southern portion of the wood being killed at 6.30 a.m. but mopping up took until midday.[184]
The difficulties of 33rd Division further south meant that the 5th Australian Division had to swing back on its right to cover the area not retaken by the 33rd Division, which at first only managed an advance to Black Watch Corner. The rest of 5th Australian Division consolidated in the German Flandern I defences just east of Polygon Wood. Another battalion from 33rd Division was sent through the Australian area to attack south-east, together with an advance from the Corner and this recaptured the ground lost the previous day by 2.00 p.m. The ground lost near Menin road was regained by the other 33rd Division brigade, also in the afternoon.[185] 4th Australian Division advanced 1,200 yards to Groote Molen (Tokio) spur without serious difficulty.
39th Division captured Tower Hamlets from the German 50th Reserve Division and 'The Quadrilateral' further down the spur from the 25th Division but this was recaptured by the Germans after being occupied by 118th Brigade, 39th Division. It had been caught in the boggy ground of the Bassevillebeek, its two tanks in support got stuck near Dumbarton Lakes and soon after arriving in The Quadrilateral, was counter-attacked by part of the German 25th Division and pushed back 200 yards.[186]
North of the I ANZAC Corps, three divisions of V Corps from Fifth Army provided the other flank guard. 3rd Division advanced to the west end of Zonnebeke, against part of 3rd Reserve Division but further north got caught in mud, lost the barrage and was stopped short of Hill 40.
A second attack later in the day on Hill 40 met a German counter-attack, leaving both sides where they started. 59th Division advanced swiftly between Waterend House and Schuler Farm, against parts of 3rd Reserve Division and 23rd Reserve Division. 58th Division's 175th Brigade attacked up the Hanebeek valley but mist and disorganisation left it 400 yards short of its objective.[188]
The RFC began operations on the night of 25–26 September when 100 and 101 Sqns attacked German billets and railway stations. The mist (which affected visibilty for the infantry later on) rose before dawn, ending night flying early. Low cloud at 5.50 a.m. when the infantry advanced, made observation difficult but contact-patrol and artillery observers managed to observe progress on the ground and reported 193 German artillery batteries to British artillery. Fighters flying at about 300 feet attacked German infantry and artillery; German aircraft tried this against British troops with some success, although ground fire shot five of them down. Six more German aircraft were shot down by RFC and RNAS pilots over the battlefield[189] Operations further afield were reduced due to the low cloud but three German airfields were attacked and an offensive patrol over the front line intercepted German bombers and escorts and drove them off.[190]
At midday the mist cleared, giving a hot clear day. British observation aircraft began to send wireless messages warning of German infantry advancing towards all of the front attacked. Similar reports from the ground began in the early afternoon; German infantry from 17th, 236th and 4th Bavarian Divisions were advancing north of Becelaere, south of Broodseinde and massing on the Broodseinde-Passchendaele Ridge. British artillery immediately bombarded these areas, disrupting the German deployment and leading to the German attacks being uncoordinated.
A counter-attack either side of Molenaarelsthoek was stopped dead at 3.25 p.m. At 4.00 p.m. Germans advancing near Reutel and to its north were bombarded as were German artillery postions in Holle Bosch and the counter-attack was dispersed. Soon after a German attack developed near Polderhoek whose survivors managed to reach the British infantry and were seen off in bayonet fighting. Reports later on revealed German troops massing against Tower Hamlets but artillery and machine-gun barrages stopped the German attack. At 6.50 p.m. the Germans managed to coordinate an attack from Tower Hamlets to north of Polygon Wood. Infantry which got through the barrages was 'annihilated' by the British infantry.
Apart from Hill 40 near Zonnebeke, where the German counter-attack met 3rd Division's renewed attack and stopped it short of the hill, the German counter-attacks could only reach the new front line.[193] The German attacks stopped at 8.30 p.m. and after a quiet night, British and ANZAC troops south of Polygon Wood occupied Cameron House and the head of the Reutelbeek valley near Cameron Covert.
Each of the three German ground holding divisions attacked on 26 September had an Eingreif division in support, twice the ratio of 20 September. No ground captured by the British had been regained and the counter-attacks had managed only to reach ground that the survivors of the front line divisions had retired to. Second Army estimated that ten divisional artilleries had supported the German troops defending the Gheluvelt Plateau, doubling the Royal Artillery casualties compared to the previous week. British losses were 15,375; 1,215 being killed. Der Weltkrieg gives 38,500 casualties between 11 September and 30 September (236th (Eingreif), 10th Ersatz, 50th Reserve, 23rd Reserve (Eingreif), 17th (Eingreif), 19th Reserve and 4th Bavarian (Eingreif) divisions)[195] to which the British Official Historian controversially added 30% for lightly wounded.[196]
After the bloody defeats of 20 and 26 September the German commanders led by Ludendorff made more changes to the defensive deployment of their troops and altered the counter-attack tactics that had been negated by Plumer's more conservative version of 'bite-and-hold'. Previously their counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had engaged in a manner analogous to 'an advance to contact during mobile operations';[197] before September this practice had given the Germans several (albeit costly) defensive successes. The defensive counter-attacks in September had been 'assaults on reinforced field positions', due to the restrained nature of British infantry advances in better visibility, which greatly increased the effectiveness of artillery—infantry liaison and were defeated with heavy casualties, after arriving too late to take advantage of the attackers' disorganisation, which had been replaced by a defence in depth behind standing barrages, in dry clear weather with increased air support for observation of German troop movements, contact patrolling and ground attack operations by the Royal Flying Corps. Systematic defensive artillery support was forfeited by Germans' uncertainty over the position of their infantry, just when the British infantry benefitted from the opposite.[198]
Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons and the reinforcement of the front garrisons of the ground holding divisions, supporting the front divisions with the Stoss regiment of the Eingreif division behind each one in the artillery protective line (behind the forward battle zone), to launch counter-attacks while the British were consolidating and the holding back of the Eingreif divisions which were to be used instead in a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after[200] and also for forestalling attacks and counter-attacks between British offensives.[201] All available machine-guns including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments were sent into the forward zone to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards.[202]
The result of these discussions was reflected in a Fourth Army operation order of 30 September, which pointed out that the German postion in Flanders was restricted by the topography, the coast and the Dutch frontier making local withdrawals impossible. Efforts were to continue be made to increase British infantry losses in line with the instructions of 22 September, with more bombardment by feld artillery and by using at least half of the heavy artillery's ammunition for observed fire on infantry positions like captured pill-boxes, command posts, machine-gun nests, duckboard tracks and field railways. Gas bombardment was to be increased on forward positions and artillery emplacements whenever the winds allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward positions where the German artillery could engage them, by making spoiling attacks to recapture pill-boxes, improve defensive positions and harass the British with patrols and diversionary bombardments.[203] Between 26 September and 3 October the Germans attacked and counter-attacked at least 24 times.[204]
The British had not been complacent and these changes were predicted in an intelligence summary of 1 October.[205][206]
The Battle of Broodseinde was the last assault launched by Plumer in good weather.[208] The operation aimed to complete the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau and the occupation of Broodseinde Ridge. This would protect the southern flank of the British line and permit attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge to the east.[209] The attack was originally planned for 6 October to permit II Anzac Corps time to prepare.[210] Haig was anxious about the possibility of deteriorating weather so he pushed to have the assault advanced by two days.[211] The Germans were equally concerned about the amount of ridge-line the British held near Zonnebeke and sought to recapture as much as possible in a local attack on 4 October.[212]
In response to the British tactic of using a shallow advance to trigger German counter-attacks and then deluging them with artillery fire employed in the two previous battles, the Germans reinforced their front line to prevent the British from capturing their forward positions.[154][208] This change failed as it left an increased number of German troops vulnerable to the British artillery.[213] On 4 October, 12 divisions from the British Fifth and Second armies attacked German positions along a 14,000 yards (13,000 m) front.[209] By coincidence, Australian troops from I ANZAC Corps met troops from the German 45th Reserve Division in no man's land when the assaults commenced simultaneously.[214] The success of the British advance varied but the losses inflicted on the Germans were devastating. The southern most corps achieved limited success, while attacks between Menin Road and Polygon Wood generated moderate gains. Further north 'The main objectives had been gained and the number of prisoners was exceptionally large, the Second army alone having taken over four thousand.'.[215] The British assault advanced an average 1,000 yards (910 m), the Australian 3rd Division advancing up to 1,900 yards (1,700 m).[216][217]
After the British attacking units reached their final positions, their artillery fired a standing barrage for an additional two and a half hours, allowing the troops to consolidate.[218] The British captured 5,000 prisoners during the battle.[219] The British high command concluded that the number of enemy casualties (4th Guard (Eingreif), 45th Reserve (Eingreif), 6th Bavarian, 4th Bavarian and 20th divisions)[220] meant that resistance was faltering and resolved to make another attack immediately, although suggestions for a further advance that day were rejected. In his memoirs, Ludendorff wrote, 'The battle on the 4 October was extraordinarily severe and again we only came through it with enormous losses.[221] Foot Guard Regt No. 5 described it as the worst day yet experienced in the war.[222] In Flandern 1917 the verdict was that,
so on 7 October the defence reverted to the previous system despite the effect of British artillery on the Eingreif divisions as they advanced.
The Fourth Army rescinded the reinforcement of the front defence zone on 7 October after the disaster of 4 October. Front line regiments were dispersed again, with reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif divisions organised to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery efforts to reduce British artillery fire were to be emphasised to protect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced. Ludendorff insisted on an advanced zone,
which was promulgated on 13 October. Artillery fire was to replace the machine-gun defence of the forward zone as far as possible. The thin line of sentries of one or two Gruppen (thirteen men and a light machine-gun each) in company sectors proved inadequate and at the end of October it was replaced by a conventional outpost system of double Gruppen. By this stage of the campaign the German defence was based on a unit of two divisions on a front of 2,500 yards, 8,000 yards deep; this was only half of the width that two divisions were thought to be able to hold and was caused by the weather, the devastating British artillery and the decline in the numbers and quality of German infantry. Camouflage, creating an invisible garrison ('die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes')was emphasised to protect the divisions from British firepower by avoiding anything resembling a trench system, in favour of dispersal in crater fields. Such a method was only made feasible by the rapid rotation of units. Battalions of the front-division were relieved after two days and divisons every six days.[225]
After the calamity on 4 October, all of the German divisions holding front zones were relieved and an extra division brought forward (195th, 16th, 4th Bavarian, 18th, 227th, 240th, 187th and 22nd Reserve divisions).[226] Without the forces necessary for a counter-offensive south of the ridges towards Kemmel Hill, Rupprecht began to plan for a slow withdrawal from Passchendaele even at the risk of uncovering German positions further north and on the coast.
The attack on 9 October on a 13,500 yards frontage from south of Broodseinde to St Jansbeek, including 650 yards to the 'red line' and 600—850 yards to the 'blue line' by the 66th Division, to the edge of Passchendaele on its first operation and over 10 divisions of the French First Army and British 2nd and 5th Armies at Poelkapelle (or Poelcappelle to the British) led to heavy casualties on both sides, with minor advances in the north of the attack by exhausted troops.[227] Birdwood later wrote,
while Von Kuhl concluded that,
showing the great strain imposed on the defence even in conditions resembling August.
The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October 1917 began with a further Allied attempt by 5 British and 3 ANZAC divisions (the New Zealand Division and the Australian 3rd and 4th Divisions) to gain ground around Passchendaele. The heavy rain again made movement difficult and artillery could not be brought closer to the front owing to the mud. The Allied troops were fought-out and morale was suffering. After a modest advance the Germans (3rd Guard (Eingreif), 220th, 5th Bavarian Reserve, 24th, 40th and 15th divisions)[230] counter-attacked, recovering most of the ground lost; the British gains were minimal and there were 13,000 Allied casualties.
On this day there were more than 2,700 New Zealand casualties, of which 45 officers and 800 men were either dead or lying mortally wounded between the lines. In terms of lives lost in a day, this remains the blackest day in New Zealand history.
The four divisions of the Canadian Corps were transferred to the Ypres Salient to make additional advances on Passchendaele.[231] The Canadian Corps relieved II Anzac Corps on 18 October from their positions along the valley between Gravenstafel Ridge and the heights at Passchendaele.[232] The front line was mostly the same as the one occupied by the 1st Canadian Division in April 1915.[232] The Canadian Corps operation was to be executed in a series of three attacks each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. As the Canadian Corps position was directly south of the inter-army boundary between the British Fifth and Second Armies, the British Fifth Army would mount subsidiary operations on the Canadian Corps's left flank while the I Anzac Corps would advance to protect the right flank.[233] The dates of the phases were tentatively given as 26 October, 30 October and 6 November.[233]
The British Fifth Army undertook two minor operations on 22 October, one with the French First Army at Houthulst Forest, the other east of Poelcappelle.[234] The objective of the attack was to maintain pressure on the Germans while the Canadians Corps prepared for their assault, as well as supporting the French attack on Malmaison.[231][235][Note 5] The attack commenced at 5:35 am, with the French 1st Division and the British 35th Division attacking towards the Houthulst Forest and the British 34th and 18th Divisions attacking from Poelcappelle.[237] The French 1st Division covered the left flank of the attack towards the Houthulst Forest, while the British 35th Division initially managed to seize its first objectives but was forced back to its starting line by German counter-attacks.[238] The left flank of the attack by the British 34th Division was unsuccessful, while the right flank managed to keep up with the attacking forces of the British 18th Division.[238]
The first stage began on the morning of 26 October.[239] The 3rd Canadian Division was assigned the northern flank which included the sharply rising ground of the Bellevue spur. South of the Ravebeek creek, the 4th Canadian Division would take Decline Copse which straddled the Ypres-Roulers railway.[240] The 3rd Canadian Division captured Wolf Copse and secured its objective line but was ultimately forced to drop a defensive flank to link up with the adjacent division of the British Fifth Army. The 4th Canadian Division initially captured all its objectives but gradually retreated from Decline Copse due to German counter-attacks and mis-communications between the Canadian and Australian units to the south.[241]
The second stage began on 30 October and was intended to capture the position not captured during the previous stage and gain a base for the final assault on Passchendaele.[241] The southern flank was to capture the strongly held Crest Farm while the northern flank was to capture the hamlet of Meetcheele as well as the Goudberg area near the Canadian Corps's northern boundary.[242] The southern flank quickly captured Crest Farm and sent patrols beyond its objective line and into Passchendaele. The northern flank again met with exceptional German resistance. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Vapour Farm at the corps's boundary, Furst Farm to the west of Meetcheele and the crossroads at Meetcheele but remained short of its objective line.[242]
To permit time for inter-divisional relief, there was a seven day pause between the second and third stages. The British Second Army was ordered to take over a section of the British Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps so that the central portion of the assault could proceed under a single command.[243] Three consecutive rainless days between 3 and 5 November aided logistical preparations and reorganization of the troops for the next stage.[244] The third stage began on the morning of 6 November with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions having taken over the front, relieving the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions respectively. Less than three hours after the start of the assault, many units had reached their final objectives and the village of Passchendaele had been captured. The Canadian Corps launched a final action on 10 November to gain control of the remaining high ground north of the village, in the vicinity of Hill 52.[245] This attack on 10 November brought to an end the long drawn-out battle.[246]
Hindenburg later wrote: "It was with a feeling of absolute longing that we waited for the beginning of the wet season. As previous experience had taught us, great stretches of the Flemish flats would then become impassable.... This battle, too, must finally stick in the mud, even though English stubbornness kept it up longer than otherwise."[247]
German troops engaged were from 239th, 39th, 4th, 44th Reserve, 7th, 11th, 11th Bavarian, 238th, 199th, 27th, 185th, 111th and 40th divisions.[248]
On 23–26 October while the Germans were busy in Flanders, the Battle of La Malmaison (Bataille de la Malmaison) under Pétain led to the capture the town of La Malmaison and control of the Chemin des Dames ridge. The French artillery preparation was massive and well coordinated. When troops from the 11th, 14th and 21st Army Corps attacked on a front of 7 1/2 miles, protected by a creeping barrage, the Germans were swiftly defeated, losing 11,157 prisoners and 180 guns. Tanks were used but this time they were lighter, faster and their attack was coordinated with the infantry. This forced the Germans to withdraw from the plateau of the Chemin des Dames 1–2 November and move to the north of the Ailette Valley; it cost the French 14,000 casualties.[250] On 24 October, The Austro-German 14th Army, under General der Infanterie Otto von Below, achieved a big victory against the Italian Army at the Battle of Caporetto. In fear that Italy might be put out of the war, the French and British Governments each promised to send six divisions to the Italian Front.[251] British and French troops were swiftly moved between 10 November and 12 December, due to good administrative preparations made by Ferdinand Foch, who had been sent to Italy in April 1917 to plan for such an emergency and who was now French Chief of Staff.[252] The parallel diversion of resources from the BEF forced Haig to conclude the 3rd Battle of Ypres, much to his dissatisfaction, just short of Westrozebeke.[253] To the south, the British Third Army had massed the means to permit the execution of a surprise attack near Cambrai.[254] The Battle of Cambrai began on 20 November and the British breached the first two parts of the Hindenburg Line in the first successful mass use of tanks in a combined arms operation.[255] The experience of the failure to contain the British attacks at Ypres and the drastic reduction in areas of the western front which could be considered 'quiet', after the tank and artillery surprise at Cambrai[256] left the German OHL with little choice but to stake all on offensive action early in 1918. The German Operation Michael began on 21 March 1918 and the supporting Battle of the Lys on 9 April. In the space of three days, the Germans reoccupied almost all of the ground taken by the Allies during the Battle of Passchendaele, after the British shortened the line there to economise on troops. The Germans were easily pushed away from Ypres once more in the Fifth Battle of Ypres on 28 September 1918.
Various casualty figures have been published, although the highest estimates for both British and German casualties appear to be discredited.
In the British Official History, Brigadier-General James E. Edmonds put British losses at 244,897 but claimed that German figures were not available. He estimated German losses at 400,000. C.R.M.F Cruttwell in A History of the Great War, 1914–1918 assessed British casualties at 300,000 and German losses at 400,000. Historian A. J. P. Taylor wrote that the Official History had performed a "conjuring trick" on these figures and that no one believed these "farcical calculations." Taylor put British losses at 300,000 and German losses at a much lower 200,000.[257] More recently, Jack Sheldon also rejected Edmonds's figures, suggesting that although the German figures (just under 220,000) were available (in Volume III of their history) Edmonds may not have included them as they did not fit his case. Sheldon stated that a figure of 400,000 could only be obtained by including all lightly wounded men, even those fit for immediate return to duty, (which was the British method of counting casualties, hence the basis for the British Official Historian's case, that 30% must be added to German figures to make them comparable).[258][259]
Cyril Falls in The Great War 1914-1918, estimated 240,000 British, 8,525 French and 260,000 German casualties.[260] In his book Haig, the Educated Soldier, John Terraine put British losses at a similar level but also did not accept that German losses were as high as 400,000. In Road to Paschendaele, Terraine argued that 20% needed to be added to the German figures to include some lightly wounded men who would have been included under British definitions of casualties, bringing estimated German casualties to 260,400.[261] Leon Wolff, a critic of Haig, claimed German casualties were 270,710 and British 448,614 but the latter figure was refuted by Terraine, who pointed out that despite stating that this was the total figure for the second half of 1917, Wolff had neglected either to deduct the 75,681 British casualties for Cambrai given in the Official Statistics from which he was quoting or to make any deduction for "normal wastage", casualties averaging 35,000 per month suffered in periods when there was no major offensive, e.g., the first thirty days of July or the latter part of December.[261] Prior and Wilson in Passchendaele (1997) give British losses as 275,000 (with soldiers permanently lost to death or severe wounds equivalent to 10–12 divisions) and German casualties just under 200,000.[262] In Forgotten Victory (2002) Gary Sheffield wrote that Richard Holmes's 260,000 apiece seemed about right.[263] In his biography of Haig (2011) he did not offer figures for either side,[264] leaving the verdict to Von Kuhl, 'The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified', noted by Sheldon (2007).[265]
Two poets, Irishman Francis Ledwidge, 25, of 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, in 29th Division, and Hedd Wyn, a Welsh-language poet serving with the Royal Welsh Fusiliers at Pilckem Ridge, were both killed in action on 31 July. Adolf Hitler fought in the Battle of Passchendaele as a member of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and was injured on the night of 13 October 1917, when he was caught in a British gas attack on a hill south of Werwick.[266]
The Menin Gate Memorial to the Missing commemorates those of all Commonwealth nations, except New Zealand, who died in the Ypres Salient and have no known grave. In the case of the United Kingdom only casualties before 16 August 1917 are commemorated on the memorial. United Kingdom and New Zealand servicemen who died after that date are named on the memorial at Tyne Cot Cemetery. There are numerous tributes and memorials all over Australia and New Zealand to ANZAC soldiers who died in the battle, including plaques at the Christchurch and Dunedin railway stations.[267] The Canadian Corps' participation in the Second Battle of Passchendaele is commemorated with the Passchendaele Memorial located at the former site of the Crest Farm on the southwest fringe of Passchendaele village.[268]
One of the newest monuments to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is the Celtic Cross memorial commemorating the Scottish contributions and efforts in the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. This memorial is located on the Frezenberg Ridge where the Scottish 9th and 15th Divisions, as part of the British Army, fought during the Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated by the Scottish Parliament's Minister for Europe Linda Fabiani during the late summer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle.